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. 7 ............................................................................................ in the 1990s was largely driven by the institution's contribution to financial rescue packages for some emerging markets, rather than having been dominated by poverty concerns and policy assessments (Section III).
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Regression results suggest that little has changed so far in targeting aid at poor countries with good policies (Section IV). All this leads to the conclusion that the task of improving the allocation of aid is far from being accomplished, which has important implications for the future role of the World Bank in development financing (Section V).
II. MISLEADING AVERAGES OF PER-CAPITA AID
The World Bank is rather imprecise in spelling out the statistical details of its calculations. The sample of countries is not given, and it is not specified whether the report refers to (gross) disbursements or net flows (disbursements minus principal repayments) of concessional IDA financing and market-related IBRD lending. In the following, we principally use net flows. In addition, we present calculations based on gross disbursements where net flows may provide a distorted picture. This applies to IDA in particular. Various developing countries which are relatively advanced and, hence, no longer eligible to IDA financing, report negative net IDA flows due to principal repayments of earlier IDA loans. These countries are excluded from the sample when assessing the distribution of gross disbursements. We follow the World Bank in taking its Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) as a yardstick of good versus poor policy.3 F 4 The income status of recipient countries and the incidence of absolute poverty is measured by GNP per capita (purchasing power parity) 4 The range is from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good). We use the classification as published in Collier and Dollar (2001: Table. Average per-capita flows for countries belonging to different policy categories are presented in Figure 1 .5 F 6 The averages given there are higher for both, poor-policy countries and good-policy countries than the above mentioned averages in World Bank (2002: xix) .6 F 7 However, this difference has no major bearing for the World Bank's essential message that IDA financing favors good-policy countries by a wide margin over poor-policy countries.
The reason why the World Bank's contention of an appropriate targeting of IDA financing is rather shaky is that group averages as reported above are seriously misleading, independent of whether averages are based on gross disbursements or net flows. Some outliers with extremely high per-capita aid from IDA in the late 1990s (see Appendix Table) distort the picture, a problem ignored by the World Bank. Cape Verde and Honduras clearly Source: Appendix Table. stand out with per-capita flows of US$ 44 and US$ 23, respectively. per-capita aid received by countries with poor policies (CPIA 2) was significantly higher in 1999 than before, if group averages are not corrected for countries with exceptionally high disbursements ( Figure 2 ). Once this correction is made, the ratio drops dramatically; and it is no longer true that the ratio increased in the course of the 1990s.
In summary, the World Bank's success story is extremely sensitive to the treatment of a few outliers in terms of per-capita aid from IDA. Success or failure in targeting aid should not be judged on arbitrary averages of percapita aid. In order to avoid such distortions, we turn to the distribution of World Bank financing in absolute terms in the subsequent section.
Moreover, we extend the discussion by analyzing World Bank lending at market related terms in addition to IDA disbursements. 
III. WHAT EXPLAINS THE DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD BANK

FINANCING?
In the following, we evaluate the allocation of absolute aid flows in the 1990s. The proposition that World Bank aid has been focused increasingly on poor recipient countries pursuing development friendly policies is checked by comparing annual averages of aid in the first half and in the second half of the 1990s. This exercise reveals that recent changes in the distribution of World Bank financing were primarily due to the institution's involvement in providing emergency loans to some major emerging markets in financial distress, rather than poverty concerns and policy assessments. presented in Figure 5 indicates that there remains considerable room for improving the allocation of aid. Almost 30 percent of total (net) World
Bank flows in 1995-1999 went to countries whose policies were rated poor or very poor. The combined share of countries with good and very good policies is very much the same (about 57 percent) for total (net) World Bank flows on the one hand, and IDA disbursements on the other hand ( Figure 5 ).1 0 F 11 Nevertheless, IDA disbursements appear to be better targeted than World Bank lending at market related terms, as the share of countries with poor and very poor policies in overall IDA disbursements is considerably lower. It is thus mainly with regard to World Bank lending that the distribution of aid conveys two related insights:
First, the institution's participation in funding rescue packages for some emerging markets had an important impact on recent World Bank financing.
Second, taking the World Bank's rhetoric on poverty and policy orientation seriously, the effectiveness of its financing could still be improved considerably by reallocating available funds.
IV. THE TARGETING OF AID: REGRESSION RESULTS
In order to better assess the targeting of World Bank aid, it seems appropriate to run some simple regressions in which both, the income status and the policy rating of recipient countries enter as independent variables. We use four different dependent variables: total net World Bank flows in per-capita terms and, alternatively, as percentage of the recipient countries' GNP, as well as gross IDA disbursements in per-capita terms and, alternatively, as percentage of the recipient countries' GNP.
The regression approach may be flawed in two respects. First, the two righthand variables, the income status and the policy rating of recipient countries, may not be independent of each other. Collinearity might be expected if minimum standards of economic development were required to pursue sound economic policies. More plausibly perhaps, collinearity may result from poor policies going along with poor economic performance and, thus, lower percapita income. As a matter of fact, the correlation between per-capita income and policy ratings turns out to be significantly positive. However, the correlation coefficient of 0.55 across all 106 sample countries is clearly below the "commonly used rule of thumb [which] is that a correlation coefficient between two explanatory variables greater than 0.8 or 0.9 indicates a strong linear association and a potentially harmful collinear relationship" (Hill et al. 1997: 173 Second, for evaluating whether targeting improved in the course of the 1990s, the optimal approach would have been to run the regressions for the first half of the 1990s on the one hand, and for the second half of this decade on the other hand. We could not take this preferable route as the World Bank's policy rating (CPIA) in the first half of the 1990s was not known to us. This is why Table 1 compares regression results achieved for average flows throughout the 1990s with results achieved for average flows in the late 1990s (1997) (1998) (1999) . For both periods, we had to apply the CPIA rating as provided by Collier and Dollar (2001: CPIA on average flows in 1990-1999, if the rating changed during the 1990s.
Such a bias would work in favor of the World Bank's claim that the policy orientation of its financial aid has become stronger since recently.
Nevertheless, the regression results in Table 1 in per-capita terms are in conflict with this proposition. Taken together, the regression results underscore our earlier reasoning that the task of improving the allocation of financial aid is far from being accomplished.
V. THE FUTURE ROLE OF WORLD BANK FINANCING
In the report presented at the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey in March 2002, the World Bank contends that the effectiveness of its financial aid has improved dramatically by a redistribution of aid in favor of poor developing countries pursuing sound economic policies. A critical evaluation reveals that the World Bank's success story rests on a rather weak empirical foundation. In particular, our findings do not support the World Bank's claim that its financial aid has been well targeted at countries with good policies.
With regard to World Bank lending, poverty concerns and policy assessments seem to have taken second place to the institution's role in co-financing rescue packages for emerging markets. This raises a first question concerning the future of World Bank financing, namely whether this institution should continue to play this role.1 5 F 16 The major argument suggesting an affirmative answer is that financial crises have frequently aggravated poverty. The World Bank (2000b: 6) notes with respect to Asia that "the deep recession had pushed millions of East Asians below the poverty line." However, the findings of Dollar and Kraay (2000) are in contrast with the widely held belief that incomes of the poor fall more than proportionally during economic crises. Furthermore, it can be questioned on several grounds that emergency financing has been effective in alleviating poverty:
• Among the Asian crisis countries, for example, the incidence of absolute poverty in Indonesia was twice as high as in Korea (59 versus 30 percent of 16 Given the focus of our analysis in the preceding sections, the subsequent discussion is restricted to financial World Bank support granted to individual developing countries. Issues related to technical assistance and the financing of international public goods, in which the World Bank may play a relevant role in the future (Sachs 1999; Nunnenkamp 2002) , are not addressed.
the population living on less than US$ 2 per day). Nevertheless, Korea received World Bank funds of US$ 6.5 billion in 1997-1999, compared with US$ 0.9 billion in the case of Indonesia. The Philippines, where the incidence of absolute poverty was still higher than in Indonesia, reported negative net flows from the World Bank in 1997-1999, even though policies of the Philippines were rated good.
• Crisis-induced increases in absolute poverty in emerging markets notwithstanding, the available data suggest that poverty problems were much more serious in developing countries with lower per-capita income. The • Another concern is that emergency financing runs the risk of bailing out the private creditors of crisis countries, rather than helping these countries to mitigate income losses. This remains a valid concern unless reforms of the Once the World Bank focuses financial support more strongly on low-income countries, a third question comes to the fore, namely how to improve the effectiveness of aid granted to these recipients. While a detailed discussion of this issue goes beyond the scope of this article, important aspects shall be addressed shortly. The most important lesson from experience with aid seems to be widely accepted by now: The idea that aid buys reform (i.e., induces governments to adopt growth-enhancing and poverty-reducing policies) has utterly failed (Collier 1997: 56) . Rather, "ownership" of reform programs by governments is critical for the effectiveness of aid. This implies that stricter conditions attached to financial aid by donors are unlikely to result in better policies and significant poverty alleviation. For aid to be effective, the initiative for policy reforms aiming at poverty alleviation has to come from the recipients themselves.
The donor community, including the World Bank, would have to support such initiatives by directing aid to reform-minded countries. This is basically what characterizes the so-called common pool approach to development assistance (Kanbur et al. 1999) . In a similar vein, the Meltzer Commission (2000: 7) recommends performance-based support of poverty related projects, e.g. in health care, primary education and physical infrastructure: "In poor countries without capital market access, poverty alleviation grants to subsidize user fees should be paid directly to the supplier upon independently verified delivery of service."
If aid flows were clearly linked to the recipients' "ownership" of poverty related reforms and projects, the current discussion on whether aid should be provided in the form of (subsidized) loans or outright grants would become considerably less relevant. In contrast to the United States administration, various European donors resist grant financing and favor loans, in order to impose discipline on the borrowing country and to replenish the World Bank's pool of loanable resources with repayments from previous borrowers. The disciplinary effect of repayment obligations stretching over decades appears to be fairly weak, however. A stronger commitment could be achieved if aid recipients were required to co-finance poverty alleviation programs supported by grants from the World Bank. Finally, refinancing of the World Bank may become less arduous once this institution can present convincing evidence to major shareholders on the effectiveness of its financial aid.
